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# OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

ARMY review(s) completed.


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**Top Secret**



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

## MEMORANDUM

### *The Situation in Vietnam*

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115

6 July 1967

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Information as of 1600  
6 July 1967

25X1

HIGHLIGHTS

Communist forces are maintaining pressure on allied units in Con Thien area. In Saigon, Premier Ky is elaborating on the role which he expects to play as Thieu's vice president in the future government.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

The intensified Communist military activity which began on 1 July immediately south of the DMZ continued through 6 July with small-unit actions as well as mortar and artillery attacks against allied positions

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Premier Ky told a convention of progovernment assemblymen that the current allocation of responsibilities between Chief of State Thieu and himself would not change if they are elected (Para. 1).

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III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:


There is nothing of significance to report.

VI. Other Major Aspects: Communists reportedly are using the Se Kong River in Cambodia to supply NVA forces in Laos and South Vietnam (Paras. 1-4).

ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics  
1963 to week of 25 June - 1 July 1967  
-Weapons and Personnel Losses  
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

6 July 1967



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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The intensified Communist military activity in the DMZ-Quang Tri Province area which began on 1 July continued through 6 July. Although enemy activities on the 6th consisted largely of preparations for possible large-scale attacks, some enemy units maintained pressure on allied forces by continued artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks, as well as small-unit probing actions.

2. Early on 6 July elements of a US Marine battalion were attacked southeast of Con Thien by an unknown-size Communist force following a 40-round mortar barrage. Several hours later, a US Marine company, supported by tanks, engaged another undetermined-size enemy force south of Con Thien. The Communists used antitank weapons in addition to small arms and mortars. Two Americans were killed and 32 wounded in these encounters. Twelve enemy soldiers are known dead.

3. Two favorite Communist targets--the US Marine airfield at Dong Ha and the nearby US Air Force radar site--were hit by harassing fire late on 6 July. No casualties or damage resulted according to the preliminary report.

25X1

6 July 1967

I-1

25X1

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Premier Ky told about 40 members of the assembly's Democratic Alliance Bloc (DAB) on 4 July that the present delegation of authority--Ky as the executor and Chief of State Thieu as the ceremonial head of government--would not change if they win the election, thus surfacing, to some extent, the private bargain the two men allegedly made. Ky told the DAB members that he has no intention of permitting the elections to become "a lottery or game of chance" and he reiterated his earlier intention to support six of the upper house slates "in such a way as to ensure their election"

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6 July 1967

II-1

25X1

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

6 July 1967

III-IV - 1

25X1

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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

1 [redacted] mid-May 180 motorboats at Stung Treng, Cambodia, on the Se (Tonle) Kong River, were loaded with cargo destined for North Vietnamese troops located just over the border in Laos.

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2. [redacted] total cargo to be moved consisted of 5,000 tons of rice, 500 200-liter gasoline drums, miscellaneous foodstuffs, medicines, and bicycles. He also stated that should water transport prove difficult, deliveries would be made by airdrop using planes from Phnom Penh and Ratanakiri, Cambodia.

3. The Se Kong is known to be an important supply route for North Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and South Vietnam. [redacted]

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

1 [redacted] stated in April that 1,200 tons a month were obtained by this route. He did not indicate, however, that the Communists were getting substantial amounts of gasoline via this route.

4. There have been no reports of airdrops in this area. Although the chief of the Cambodian Air Force has reportedly used Cambodian aircraft in smuggling operations to the Communists, the Cambodian Air Force has a very limited airlift capability.

6 July 1967



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## Weapons Losses







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## Personnel Losses (Killed only)\*



US Casualties to Date: Killed 11,533 Wounded 69,870 Captured 185 Missing 489

\*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly and monthly figure will represent only personnel killed.



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